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Professor Jose Julian Alvarez-Gonzalez 
Escuela de Derecho 
Universidad de Puerto Rico 
Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico 
Dear Professor Alvarez: 
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My thanks for your courtesy in sending me your manuscript. And I do 
appreciate your solicitation of my comments. 
To be complete, I think you may want to consider (if not respond to) the 
enclosed brief article manuscripts as well, since both do bear on, and round 
out, the two selections of which your manuscript is quite critical. The first is a 
finished version of the paper I shared in outline in Puerto Reo. Had it not been 
previously promised to the Iowa Law School, I would have been pleased to 
have finished it for your law review instead. As it is literally "Part II" to the 
Illinois Law Review article, however, and was the occasion for my appearance 
in Puerto Rico, it probably should be accounted for in your response. It will 
appear this summer, as part of a symposium issue occasioned by the 
dedication of the new University of Iowa Law Schol building. 
The other, much shorter piece, will appear this next month in the Journal 
of Legal Education. It is a finished form of a brief paper I presented at the 
plenary session of the AALS in January, in Los Angeles, on "The Idea of the 
Constitution as Hard Law". The four pieces, beginning with the University of 
Florida piece, and carrying through these three, more or less complete what I 
mean to say on the general subject of judicial review, standards, and the 
Supreme Court. Together, I think they may state a general thesis somewhat 
less vulnerable than your conscientious draft supposes. Part IV of the longer 
paper should test you considerably. 
On some minor matters, let me add a few minor points. First, history 
obviously matters--if one had no idea even of the nature of the problem or 
concern to which a clause in the Constitution were directed, one would have no 
useful orientation in selecting among radically different (and even mutually 
exclusive) applications of the clause. An excellent example is the first 
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amendment. If one were quite convinced that "the" freedom of speech and of 
the press that solely accounted for the amendment was an objection solely to a 
licensing system, and nothing more, then I suggest one would necessarily 
concede that the Supreme Court would have falsified that amendment in 
"reading" it as embracing some larger proposition--whether or not you and I 
regretted the limited objective of the clause. Indeed, I take it for granted that 
academic debate on the origins of the first amendment is passionate and 
intense partly because all implicitly recognize that a great deal is at stake; that 
the origins of the amendment are not merely of interest to antiquarians, but 
that they count heavily with one, respecting the assessment of the Supreme 
Court's own work (exactly in the same way critics are very fond of falsifying 
Lochner, as Holmes did, by suggesting the Court "read" into the due process 
clause its own economic agenda). The enclosed book review reprint provides 
you with an example, concretely, of that particular history--and why, most of 
all in light of that history, I believe a very strong view of the first amendment's 
free speech and free press clause is entirely proper. 
Second, Marshall is not a "noninterpretivist" by any plausible view, 
although the matter does not bother me a great deal since, as you 
acknowledge, the coiners of that ludicrous phrase have now abandoned it 
from embarrassment. Marshall was, first of all, responsible for a general 
presumption or rule of "generous construction", as I spell out in the enclosed 
manuscript, and Marshall applied that rule with a fair degree of generality as 
others have failed to do, e.g., he applied it to protect private commercial 
interests under Article I, § 10, quite as much as he did re the enumerated 
powers vested in Congress. But I do agree that Marshall also fudged--by 
adding something which I also examine critically, once again, in the enclosed 
manuscript. Neither he (nor you) offer any plausible reason why, once it is 
conceded that the national government is one of enumerated powers only, 
there is any reason (other than one of fudging) to relieve the party relying on an 
act of Congress from the obligation of showing the foundations of its 
authorization in the Constitution. 
Similarly, at page 24, I think you may have misunderstood. I did indeed say 
that the early decisions had more of the look and feel of constitutional law than 
do equivalent decisions today. The point was not to contradict my misgivings 
with some manipulations of judicial standards even during the Marshall Court 
era, however, but a different point altogether. It was, rather, that because the 
Court was still in its youth, it was not encumbered by past precedents of its 
own in accounting for its work. Thus, it could more easily seem to be 
proceeding coherently and consistently, simply from having less handicap in 
having to "explain" and "distinguish" the accumulated precedents already 
amassed under the clauses it applied and "interpreted". My point is that, over 
time, that early advantage (which makes it easier to "write your own ticket") 
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isn't quite so easy or convincing. The debris of past decisions, other 
manipulated standards of review, etc., confront the later court. Indeed, the 
rank politicization of the judicial process becomes a much more obvious 
phenomenon. 
Additionally, as a scholarly matter, the "final"verdict on Brown, as well as 
Roe is not now in; respectfully, your sense of moral certitude (so widely shared 
by others) is altogether misplaced, even as Bickel (in his work on the Warren 
Court and the Idea of Progress) came fully to appreciate. (In that book, Bickel 
suggested, very critically, that the Warren Court, confident of its grasp of how 
the future would "look back" on its decisions, decided cases according to that 
confidence, wanting much more to be remembered as a "good" Court than any 
other way; so it began to lay the actual Constitution aside, to nudge its own 
preferred moral confidence into place.) My current article is partly an attempt 
to lay bare the conflict, rather than the reconcilability, of conscientious fidelity 
to the judicial oath (to support this Constitution) and the usual human foible 
of imagining one's philosophy to possess a superiority sufficient to entitle one 
to substitute it by fiat. 
But, equally, at p. 27, you are seriously in error in suggesting a similarity of 
my views with those of Raoul Berger; his habit is (a) to prefer a rule of narrow 
construction, (b) to impute a narrow parochialism to those who were chiefly 
responsible for the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the fourteenth 
amendment, (c) to subordinate express clauses to unexpressed exceptions, and 
(d) to read "history" as meanmindedly as the narrowest partisan culling of the 
debates may lend itself to--none of which and no single part of which strikes 
me as sound. 
As to the suggestion that the criticism is merely that the Court's 
"methodology" is wrong (p. 27, fotnote 53), I think, rather, that: (a) there is no 
consistent methodology, rather, it is too frequently the case that the 
methodology is whatever serves preselected outcomes (in brief, a number of 
men who have served on the Supreme Court do in fact "lie" even about their 
methodology as well as what they purport to do), and (b), despite the poetic 
grace of your concluding potpurri of suggestions, I find no methodology either 
proposed or defended. Indeed, I cannot make out any "methodology" at all. 
Looking back over this letter, it reads much more harshly than I intended, 
for which I apologize. Still, I think it incumbent on you to try to do two things; 
first, deal with the enclosed manuscript, especially part IV and the illustrative 
footnotes. Second, "come clean" with a defense of whatever alternative way of 
doing constitutional law you personally and professionally find suitable to 
embrace. In footnote 45 of the enclosed manuscript, I suggest three rival 
melaphors for the constitution: proteus, the dead sea scrolls, and redwood 
·trees (with amendments as cambium rings). Which of these comes closest to 
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your own mark? Which do you professionally elect to identify with, and why? 
And, of course, if these three seem to you to be unfair, i.e., to leave a fourth and 
better one out of account, what is it? How would you describe it? What would 
you think to be your own obligation if you were placed on the Supreme Court? 
Again, my sincere thanks for sending your provocative article. I hope our 
exchange of correspondence will be useful. 
Best personal regards, 
William Van Alstyne 
June I, 1987 
